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BOOK REVIEW
LAW IS NOT ENOUGH
BERTA

E.

HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*

Gender Injustice: An International Comparative Analysis of Equality in
Employment. Anne-Marie Mooney Cotter. Ashgate Press, 2004.
Pp. 306, $114.95 (hardcover).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the United Nations reported "in no society today do
women enjoy the same opportunities as men."' The condition and
status of women worldwide was one of social, political, educational,
legal, and economic inequality. 2 Ten years later, women's economic disparities persist.3 In Gender Injustice: An International ComparativeAnalysis of Equality in Employment, Dr. Anne-Marie Mooney
Cotter focuses on women's global inequality in employment. The
book's in-depth examination of women's second-class, subordinated status in the workplace around the world provides invaluable
insights into the complexities of gender inequality.
* Levin Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of Florida.
L.L.M. 1982, New York University School of Law; J.D. 1978, Albany Law School, Union
University; B.A. 1974, Cornell University. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance
of Elizabeth M. Crowder, J.D. 2005, University of Florida, and Cindy Zimmerman.

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995:
GENDER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 29 (1995) (noting "a widespread pattern of inequality
1.

between women and men-in their access to education, health and nutrition, and even
more in their participation in the economic and political sphere"), http://hdr.undp.org/
reports/global/1995/en/ (last visited June 20, 2005).
2. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcrICES
FOR 1995 (1996) (stating that women "face discrimination in access to education, employment, healthcare, financial services including credit, and even food and water"), http://
(last
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995-hrp-report/95hrp-report-over-view.html
visited July 6, 2005).
3. In 2005, the United Nations 49th Session of the Commission on the Status of
Women met in New York to evaluate the condition of women ten years after the 1995
Beijing Conference on Women. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Beyond Beijing: Towards
9
Gender Equality in Politics, http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/csw4 .htm (last visited June 21,
2005). For the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, see Beijing Declarationand Platformfor
Action, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20
(1995) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
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GENDER INJUSTICE IN TODAY'S GLOBAL LABOR FORCE: KEY
CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

The first two chapters, entitled Introduction to Gender Injustice and
Gender Injustice and Women are ambitious undertakings that provide
critical foundational information. In the first chapter, Dr. Cotter
defines her focus as "the goal of gender equality, and the importance of the law and legislation to combat discrimination. ' 4 The
book succeeds both in documenting the ubiquity of gender inequality in the workplace and in providing a blueprint to achieve
gender justice. 5
Pertinent considerations in the quest for gender equality include
fundamental rights, gender discrimination in the labor market, the
role of women in global society, the rule of law, and equality in
employment. Dr. Cotter provides a useful two-page synopsis of
women's location in society that nicely situates the need for this
book: "internationally, men continue to dominate the labor
force,"6 meaning that women's hourly earnings, regardless of
whether a state is developed or developing, core or periphery, is
below that of men; 7 and women, more than men, are likely to be
found in low-wage employment, with the result of "poverty
ha[ving] a woman's face."8
Dr. Cotter observes that globalization and its consequences have
had a deleterious impact on women's employment because:
[m]acroeconomic and social policy amended within the context
of economic reform programs and globalization trends have
resulted in decreases of public expenditures and social welfare
provisions. The consequences impact disproportionately upon
women and girls in areas such as education, training, health
care and social services, public sector employment and general
unemployment, and in basic needs such as food and medicines.
Women have fewer opportunities for income generation, yet
they are expected to provide economic and social sustenance
for their families and communities. 9

4.

ANNE-MARIE MOONEY COTTER, GENDER INJUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS OF EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT 2 (2004).

5. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. On the impacts of globalization, see also id. at 85 (noting that globalization's
"international economic developments have had a disproportionate impact on women and
children" including "a negative impact on women's employment," resulting in the placement of women in low paying jobs with low security and often dangerous working conditions, and where female employment, simply based on sex, is "under-remunerated and
undervalued").
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One specific obstacle globalization creates for women's economic advancement is the growth of the informal sector. Available
jobs were "created in recent agro and tertiary industry expansion
[which] involve labor-intensive, low-paid, and informal activities
that are sub-contracted to women, often on a casual insecure
basis." 10 Women's lack of education and lack of technical skills
necessary for obtaining better jobs has, in turn, affected their ability to care for their families.
The Rule of Law section in the first chapter seeks to cover an
exceedingly difficult topic in a mere page and a half. The result is
a difficult read with too many vague points, excessive jargon, an
unclear purpose, and inconsistent propositions." For example,
Dr. Cotter claims that "[b]y legitimizing the legal process and holding up the ideals of equality in the fight against gender injustice,
12
the law and the courts can bring about change." This statement,
however, cannot be reconciled with the reality that laws mandating
equality have existed for decades at the international, regional, and
local levels, yet, as Dr. Cotter herself has ably documented, inequality persists. Perhaps Dr. Cotter could have simply posited her
thesis that " 'Gender Injustice' offers a defense of the notion that
social reform is possible through key institutions, which include
3
the legal system and its use of the law"' and then proceeded to
explain to the reader how she intended to prove that proposition.
Dr. Cotter introduces several important concepts in chapter 1.
She defines gender as "the social attributes and opportunities associated with being female and male, and the relationships between
women and men, and girls and boys, as well as between women and
between men," 1 4 a concept that is "socially constructed and . . .
learned through socialization." 1 5 This social construct helps
explain why there are inequalities in economic activities and disparities in opportunities between men and women around the
world.
Dr. Cotter also explains the concepts of equal pay for equal work
and comparable worth, 16 and provides vital information on
10. Id. at 4.
11. For a discussion on the complexity of the rule of law concerns, see Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, The Rule of Law and Human Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 167 (2004).
12.

COTTER, supra note 4, at 5.

13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 6-7. Comparable worth reflects the concept of "equal pay for work of equal
value" with respect to which "male and female workers are protected from discrimina-

1034

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 37

women's and men's relative earning capacities. Dr. Cotter
debunks economists' rationalizations of the gender gap, such as
the differential market value of what women produce, by applying
the theory of human capital to explain women's wage gaps and job
sector segregation as the consequences of discrimination. 17
Women's inequality results from disparate education, training, and
work experiences-factors largely dependent on gendered perceptions of women's appropriate social location-as well as their relegation to the reproductive sphere. 18 This latter reality leads to the
dual burden of women who work outside the home and also bear
the onus of childcare and housework.
In chapter 2, Gender Injustice and Women, Dr. Cotter first offers a
brief overview of feminist theories 19 that are "based on the reality
of specific historical experiences of oppression" 2 0 in order to provide the foundations of how gender "identifies the persistence of
asymmetric power relations." 21 The practical legal applications of
these theoretical frameworks often fail to effect women's equality
because of the structural male bias of law. The "liberal paradigm
sees the women's struggle for equal access but ... falls short of its
stated goal" because formal legal equality-the male-centric model
in which women can be equal to men so long as they can do the
things men do-ignores real inequalities and differences, such as
women's role in childbearing. 2 2 The social welfare paradigm, on
the other hand, accepts women's differences and acknowledges
specific matters necessary to women's equality "such as maternity
leave, aid to women with children and childcare services." 23 Protion . . . when they are performing different jobs for the same employer." To evaluate
whether the work is of equal value, "a comparison of the work is required, which involves
assessing the nature of the tasks and the demands made upon the workers in carrying them
out, such as skill, effort and responsibility." Id. at 7. In evaluating the nature of the job,
the criteria cannot discriminate based on gender. Id. It is noteworthy that the comparable
worth doctrine has not been embraced in the United States. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
17. COTrER, supra note 4, at 7-8 (arguing that "people can increase their productivity
by investing in themselves" mainly in "formal education and in work training").
18. Id. at 7, 10.
19. See id. at 16-17 (discussing liberal, radical, cultural, socialist, and post-modernist
feminism). For a more extensive discussion of the various feminisms, see Berta E. HernAndez-Truyol, Crossing Borderlands of Inequality with InternationalLegal Methodologies-The
Promise of Multiple Feminisms, 44 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 113 (2001); Berta E. HernindezTruyol, Out of the Shadows: Traversing the Imaginary of Sameness, Difference, and RelationalismA Human Rights Proposal, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 111 (2002).
20. COTTER, supra note 4, at 16.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 19.
23. Id.
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grams such as these, which focus on women's reproductive and
childcare roles, however, "often define differences inappropriately
24
and serve to make people dependent."
Dr. Cotter posits that "[a] viable solution is the dynamic
proceduralist paradigm, which sees women as essential to public
25
discussions, adding to the necessary process of valued discourse."
Despite recognizing the structural bias of the legal system, Dr. Cotter holds that "[t]he transformative potential of the law is the role
it can play in the creation of a society based on an ethic, which
responds to needs, honours differences and rejects discriminatory
abstractions." 26 In order for law to achieve this transformative
potential, Dr. Cotter proposes a new, woman-centered strategy that
deconstructs male biases in the law and reconstructs a system
grounded upon true equality-equality in fact, as well as in law.
Dr. Cotter, however, fails to explain how she would achieve this
paradigmatic shift: over time, it has become clear that law is not
enough.
The second part of chapter 2 focuses on gender segregation,
equal value, and wage solidarity in the labor market. Using the
theory of labor market discrimination-which she describes as "a
labor queue, comprised of ordered elements, with society granting
men first choice of jobs which are the most attractive" 27- Dr. Cotter observes "that earning differences are based on race and gender, [and can] only [be] reduced through effective enforcement of
anti-discrimination policies." 28 Gendered occupational segregation exists both in horizontal and vertical planes: the elements systematically and structurally favor men, and result in a "high ranked
male workforce [that] has grown the fastest, is paid the best, has
more vocational training, requires less strength, and shelters
incumbents from competition." 29 Men occupy the high-paying
"sectors of management, craft and transportation... while women
are usually found in the service and administrative support jobs as
well as the semi-professional female dominated sectors of nursing,
library, social work and teaching."3 0 In short, men have high-pay24.

Id.
25. Id. (footnote omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 24-25.
30. Id. at 25 (noting that "half of women [are] found in three traditional female
careers, namely the clerical, sales and service sectors," id. at 27, that "roughly 80 percent of
people ... [are] not work[ing] with the opposite sex," id. at 28 (footnote omitted), and
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ing white and blue collar jobs, while women generally have lowpaying pink collar jobs.
Dr. Cotter attributes women's degree of progress in recent years
to a myriad comprehensive domestic, regional, and international
norms proscribing discrimination. 3 1 Yet notwithstanding the existence of those laws, pure disparities3 2 and systemic inequities 33 persist: discrimination-including hierarchical and patriarchal hiring
practices; retaliatory practices; and the channeling and marginalization of female workers-explains this ongoing inequality.3 4
Dr. Cotter's discussion of the role of globalization and neoliberal
economies in maintaining depressed wages for women-as well as
the wages of other non-elite workers, such as racial minorities and
citizens of the periphery-is a valuable contribution to the literature. 35 The solutions she posits to this wage problem, however,
appear to be contradictory: First, she urges a woman-centered
approach, plainly stating that "[w] omen's inequality must be at the
centre of the debate." 36 Next, she suggests a wage solidarity
approach 37 that focuses on class rather than on a gender-specific, 38
39
equal value-comparable worth approach.
To be sure, Dr. Cotter properly critiques the comparable worth
approach 40 as laden with virtually insurmountable structural
problems, not the least of which is that measures of "value" simply
"reflect and rationalize the [existing] unequal class structure, since
heavy weight is assigned to skill and responsibility rather than
effort and working conditions.."4 1 A comparable worth approach,
therefore, neither interrogates nor critiques the entrenched status
quo that perpetuates existing gendered hierarchies such as
that "wages are strongly linked to the proportion of females in an occupation, as the
femaleness of an occupation still correlates to lower wages." Id.).
31. See id. at 1-3, 41-89, passim.
32. Id. at 27 (defining these as inequalities "where one is paid less for the same job").
33. Id. (defining these as inequities "where there are discriminatory effects to policies
and practices").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 33 ("The periphery consists of women, youth, and minorities."); see also id.at
87 (noting that factors such as "race, ethnicity, culture, indigenousness, age, language,
religion, or disability" exacerbate women's barriers).
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. (noting that "wage solidarity seeks to push up the wages of the lowest paid to
an acceptable living standard, flattening the hierarchy and eliminating gender bias in pay
differentials").
38. Id. at 30, 33.
39. Id. at 30-31.
40. See generally id.
41. See id.at 31.
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women's responsibility for the physical and emotional support of
the family.
While these realities render a value approach ineffectual in
regards to the advancement of women, Dr. Cotter fails to explain
how the non-woman-centered wage solidarity approach-which
seeks to use labor unions to raise wages by promoting worker solidarity42-will help women. Indeed, the author readily admits that
in unions, "[t]he full-time permanent pensionable core is mostly
made up of white males, while the periphery consists of women,
youth and minorities." 43 It is difficult to contemplate that organizations that "provide for gender segmentation of the market, support the traditional ideology of women's work and male
breadwinners, resist broader bargaining, and enforce patriarchal
bureaucratic hierarchy," 4 4 would take the necessary steps to ensure
women's equality. 45 The microcosm of the union demands the
same effort as society at large: society must make women visible,
interrogate structural male bias, and center the woman question to
46
attain gender justice.
Perhaps rather than either a woman-centered or a wage-solidarity approach, Dr. Cotter is really proposing a novel hybrid: a
woman-centered, wage-solidarity model. If that is the case, it would
have been useful to have her insights on how, in light of the malecenteredness of the models, such models could be reconstructed to
create an effective hybrid. Yet Dr. Cotter fails to explain how
women's continued second-class citizenship in the work-force, in
spite of "significant strides in the past decades," 4 7 can be reconciled with the complex and extensive collection of nondiscrimination laws-the very laws that Dr. Cotter suggests are part of the
solution. Indeed, persistent inequality in light of such norms
forces an interrogation of the efficacy of law to eliminate gender
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
45. Necessary steps should include considering "the homefront not just the job
sphere" in the equation; incorporating "equitable distribution of paid work"; imposing
"[riestrictions on overtime"; and addressing "[i]mportant women's issues such as sexual
harassment, childcare, maternity, affirmative action and pay equity." Id. at 33.
46. On the woman question, see AuGusT BEBEL, Woman and Socialism, in WOmtAN:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Meta L. Stern trans., 1918), reprinted in HuMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION 1600-PRESENT 86, 87 (John A. Maxwell & James J. Friedberg eds., 1994)
("[T]he woman question demands our special consideration. What the position of woman
has been in ancient society, what her position is today and what it will be in the coming
social order, are questions that deeply concern at least one half of humanity.").
47. COTTER, supra note 4, at 26.
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injustice. One glaring example of this persisting inequality is the
failure of the comparable worth concept, which was introduced by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1951 in an effort to
end gender wage disparities, when the organization was ostensibly
caving in to the inevitability of job segregation. 48 Although Dr.
Cotter recognizes that the women's movement had an impact on
policy and legislative change, and that women have altered the
composition of the labor force by their increased participation
over the last thirty years, neither legislation nor the increased participation of women has eliminated job segregation or low pay. 49
III.

GENDER INJUSTICE AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Chapter 3, Gender Injustice and the United Nations, is another bold
undertaking, most of which-particularly the extensive textual
quotes from documents-would have been better placed in an
appendix. The value of the information, however, cannot be questioned. The chapter examines United Nations treaties and declarations 50 and signals key international legal provisions protecting the
48. The Equal Remuneration Convention, International Labour Organization (ILO)
Convention No. 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for
Work of Equal Value, adoptedJune 29, 1951, entered into force May 23, 1953 [hereinafter the
Equal Remuneration Convention], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 45-46.
49. COTrER, supra note 4, at 35-36.
50. The author provides extensive quotations from the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), adopted Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter Universal Declaration], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 41-43; United Nations Charter (as amended),
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T. S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945
[hereinafter U.N. Charter], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 43-45; Statute of the International
Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (June 26, 1945), in COTrER,
supra note 4, at 45; Equal Remuneration Convention, supra note 48; Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, ILO Convention No. 111 (concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation), adoptedJune 25, 1958, entered into
forceJune 15, 1960, in COTrER, supra note 4, at 46-47; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter
ICCPR], in COrER, supra note 4, at 47-50; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), adopted on Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force March 23, 1976, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 50; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into farceJan. 3,
1976 [hereinafter ICESCR], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 450-53; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33, entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter CEDAW], in COTrrER, supra note 4, at 53-60; Optional
Protocol to the CEDAW, adopted Dec. 10, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4, in COTTER, supra
note 4, at 60-63; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Jan. 7, 1966, I.L.M. 352, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter
ICEAFRD], in COTrER, supra note 4, at 64; Beijing Declaration, supra note 3, in COTTER,
supra note 4, at 65-88.
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rights to equality,5 1 nondiscrimination, 52 equal pay, 53 and education-the latter a right inextricably linked to women's ability to
better their employment opportunities. 54 Of significant note,
international norms mandate the elimination of stereotyping
based on sex, which are often pretextually effected by relying on
55
cultural tropes.
The author introduces the concept of gender mainstreaming, an
approach used by the United Nations in its deliberations 56 that
takes into account the impact that a particular policy or norm will
have on women. Dr. Cotter also underscores the "universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated" 57 nature of all human
rights-including civil, political, cultural, economic, and social
rights-all of which are imperative for women to attain equality.
Women constitute the majority of persons living in "abject poverty"; 58 are a small minority of all elected legislators world-wide, at
approximately 10 percent; 59 and disproportionately bear the
responsibility of caring for children and family, all while living in a
world with an "unbalanced distribution of remunerated and
60
unremunerated work between women and men."
It is noteworthy and laudable that the author recognizes the
nonessential nature of women. 6 1 Because women are multidimen51. Universal Declaration, supra note 50, art. 2; ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 3; ICESCR,
supra note 50, art. 3; UN Charter, supra note 50, at Preamble & art. 55; ICEAFRD, supra
note 50, art. 2; CEDAW, supra note 50, passim, arts. 4, 15; Beijing Declaration, supra note 3,
passim.
52. Universal Declaration, supra note 50, art. 7; ICCPR, supra note 50, arts. 2, 26;
ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 2; CEDAW, supra note 50, passim, arts. 1, 2, 7, 13.
53. Universal Declaration, supra note 50, art. 23; ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 7; Equal
Remuneration Convention, supra note 48, art. 2; and CEDAW, supra note 50, art. 11.
54. For the right to education, see Universal Declaration, supra note 50, art. 26;
ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 13.
55. See CEDAW, supra note 50, art. 5.
56. COTrER, supra note 4, at 79.
57. Id. at 82. Noting that:
complete realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all women
[is] essential for the empowerment of women. While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all people.
Id. at 84.
58. Id. at 86.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 87.
61. For a discussion of essentialism, see Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, in CRrncAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTrING EDGE 253-66 (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995).
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sional beings, 62 identity factors such as race, ethnicity, culture, age,
language, religion, and/or disability also have an impact on claims
to equality. 63 To that list, I would add education, sexuality, class,
and migration status as significant identity components that have
an impact on gender injustice as they effect the marginalization of
women.64
IV.

GENDER INJUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Having presented the theoretical, factual, and legal backgrounds
in the first three chapters, Dr. Cotter engages in the heart of the
work in chapters 4 through 9. Rather than examining specific
countries, chapters 7 and 9 review regional arrangements, specifically the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)65 and
the treaty forming the European Union (EU), respectively.
A.

Gender Injustice and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)

Dr. Cotter begins chapter 7 by recognizing that NAFTA has had
"an important impact on women and the labor force." 66 After
introducing NAFTA, Dr. Cotter aims to examine the treaty's drawbacks "in general and in regard to women," 67 yet, this aim is not
fulfilled. The chapter begins by presenting NAFTA's history;68 a
summary of numerous provisions; 69 and an overview of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).70 Women
are only specifically mentioned where the author notes the impor71
tance of cooperative activities for sex equality under NAALC.
62. For a discussion of multidimensionality, see Berta E. Hernhndez-Truyol, Building
Bridges-Latinasand Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1994).
63. COTTER, supra note 4, at 87.

64. See generally Berta E. Hernndez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas: Gendered injustice/Gendered
Injustice-Latinas,Fronteras, and the Law, I J. GENDER, RACE &JUSTICE 353 (1998); Berta E.
Hemindez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered-Normativities,Latinas and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 882 (1997).
65. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 180-87, 193-200.
66.

COTTER, supra note 4, at 175.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 175-80.
Id. at 180-87.
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499

[hereinafter NAALC], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 188-93.

71.

COTTER, supra note 4, at 193.
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The section on NAFTA's benefits and concerns evaluates and critiques the treaty and its neoliberal economic policies. 72 Even in
this section, however, gender concerns are raised only in passing
when the author notes that " '[t] he burden of Free Trade driven
restructuring was shared unequally on a national, regional, class
and gender basis.' "73 No explanation of the stated nexus is
provided.
A mere two paragraphs focus on women in relation to NAFTA.
One passage proclaims that "there is a gender gap" 74 concerning
free trade and notes that more women than men oppose free trade
"because it affects every issue women in this country are concerned
about, including day care, health care, the environment, consumer
protection and prices." 75 The next asserts that free trade and
globalization affect the jobs women hold and lead to depressed
wages and diminished benefits, 7 6 and result in increased
77
unemployment.
Although this chapter contains much important information
and historical contextualization of NAFTA, it is a misnomer to
label it Gender Injustice and the North American Free TradeAgreement, as
that direct topic is barely addressed. 78 This chapter would have
been a useful contribution to the literature had it focused on the
gendered impacts of NAFTA in more detail. If there is a lack of
information, this could be a rallying call for empirical research.
B.

Gender Injustice and the European Union

In contrast to chapter 7, chapter 9 actually focuses on women in
the context of the EU's treaty arrangement. Beginning with a
review of women's role in European society, the chapter reveals
women's now-familiar higher rates of unemployment and the persistent gendered pay gap, which is present regardless of education
79
and family status.
72. Id. at 193-200.
73. Id. at 196 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 198.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 199.
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 71, 73, and accompanying text. See generally COTTER, supra note 4,
at 175 (addressing generally the history of NAFTA, NAFTA, and the side agreement on
labor cooperation), 193 (discussion of equal pay, NAFTA benefits and concerns), 198-200
(discussion of gender issues).
79. See, e.g., COTTER, supra note 4, at 239-41.
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After providing useful demographic information that illustrates
women's persistent inequality across class and education lines, the
chapter offers an appropriately brief history of the formation of
the EU. 80 Article 141 of the Treaty of Amsterdam entrenched the
principle of equal pay for equal work, or for work of equal value,
for men and women-a principle with which each EU member
states' domestic law must be consistent in order to avoid preemption.8 1 Thus, EU law makes significant strides to promote equality
in employment and proscribe both direct and indirect
82
discrimination.
Dr. Cotter then describes five key EU institutions8 3 and proceeds
to discuss the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)8 4 and the European
Social Charter. 5 While the ECHR did not include a nondiscrimination provision, Protocol 11 provides a nondiscrimination clause

80. Id. at 243-50. The history of the European Union (EU) begins with the Treaty of
Paris which established the coal and steel community. Treaty Establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140, in COTTER, supra note 4, at
243. Next came the Treaty of Rome, the treaty which created the European economic
community and required member states to transfer to the community the ability to enter
into treaties with international organizations and non-member states, and also required
member states to agree to the free movement of labor and capital within the community.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Union, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], in COTTER, supra note 4, at 243-45. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty
created the EU which effectively created an international market with free movement of
goods, capital, services, and citizens of member states. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 253, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 245-46. Finally, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam amended the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56, in
COTTER, supra note 4, ai 246-50.
81. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 80, art. 141, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 247. See
also European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (espousing the notion of
equal pay for work of equal value for male and female workers), in COTTER, supra note 4, at
256-58.
82. Dr. Cotter distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination, noting that
direct discrimination is different treatment and indirect discrimination occurs when a neutral norm has disparate impact on the different genders. Indeed, community law allows
E.U. member states to enact measures to eradicate impacts of past discrimination, current
discrimination, and to promote equality of opportunity in employment. COTTER, supra
note 4, at 248.
83. The five institutions include the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Court ofJustice, and the Court of
Auditors. Id. at 250.
84. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], in COTTER, supra note 4, at
253-55.
85. European Social Charter, see supra note 81.

2005]

Law Is Not Enough

1043

that promotes gender equality. 86 In addition, Protocol 12 8prohibits
7
discrimination on numerous grounds, including gender.
The European Social Charter promotes the right to equal opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation-including vocational training, promotion, and working
88
conditions-without discrimination based on gender. The Charter provides for maternity rights, with a view towards women's ability to exercise their real, as opposed to merely theoretical, equal
employment rights. 89 Finally, Dr. Cotter documents myriad European Community directives that provide for equal pay and equal
treatment of women, 90 yet, she fails to explain why, if law is a means
for change, there remains persistent inequality in the workforce
despite laws promoting equality.
C.

Gender Injustice Throughout the World

Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8 examine gender injustice in various countries by reviewing the role of women and analyzing equality legislation in each state. Before delving into a discussion of Dr. Cotter's
useful analysis, one critique is appropriate: although Dr. Cotter recognizes women's multidimensionality in the introductory chapters,
she fails to consider diversity between and among women in her
state-by-state analysis. This is unfortunate in view of Dr. Cotter's
acknowledgment that diversity has an impact on women's occupa86. Protocol 11 to European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 5, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 943, in COTrER, supra note 4, at 254.
87. Protocol 12 to European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, C.E.T.S. 177, entered into forceJan. 4, 2005, http://www.echr.coe.
int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visitedJune 20, 2005), in COTTER, supra note 4,
at 255.
88. European Social Charter, supra note 81, in COT-ER, supra note 4, at 255-58.
89. COTTER, supra note 4, at 257 (noting European Social Charter, supra note 81, arts.
8, 27).
90. Id. at 258-64. The directives include: (a) on equal pay, Council Directive 75/
117/EEC, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, Feb. 10, 1975; (b) on equal treatment, specifically prohibiting discrimination on grounds of gender, Council Directive 76/
207/EEC, Feb. 9, 1976, and Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council, amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC, Sept. 23, 2002 (This right is also
Universal Declaration, supra note
reflected in numerous international documents. See, e.g.,
50; CEDAW, supra note 50; ICEAFRD, supra note 50; ICCPR, supra note 50; ICESCR, supra
note 50); (c) on equality of treatment for men and women in social security, Council
Directive 79/7/EEC, Dec. 19, 1978; Council Directive 86/378/EEC, July 24, 1986; and
Council Directive 86/613/EEC, Dec. 11, 1986; and (d) on protections of women during
pregnancy, Council Directive 92/85/EEC, Oct. 19, 1992. COTrER, supra note 4, at 258-64.
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tional attainments.9 1 Had'she reported disaggregated data about
different subordinations women experience by race, sexuality,
religion, culture, ethnicity, or endogenous status category, Dr. Cotter would have provided an invaluable service.
Significantly, in chapters 4 (reviewing Australia and New Zealand), 5 (reviewing Africa and South Africa), 6 (reviewing Canada,
Mexico, and the United States), and 8 (reviewing the United Kingdom and Ireland), Dr. Cotter reports the same patterns she relates
in chapter 2 and then reiterates in chapter 10: in every state, notwithstanding favorable legislation,92 women experience a gender
wage gap regardless of education,job segregation, and the onus of
the double duty.9 3 These patterns persist as global realities, even in
light of marked progress in education and labor force participation
within the last few decades.94 As space does not permit a detailed
country analysis, only noteworthy particularized observations will
be highlighted.
1.

Gender Injustice in Australia and New Zealand

Dr. Cotter notes that in New Zealand "[e]thnicity plays a factor
in gender discrimination . . . [with] Maori, Pacific and women
from 'other' ethnic groups [being] currently less likely to partici91. See COTrER, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that race and age are also factors in employment discrimination); id. at 13 (noting that "[g]eneralities are not presumed nor are they
made here for this would detract from the very purpose of this book" and that the book
"does not rule out other forms of injustices"); id. at 16 (observing that "the female experience is diverse and shaped by race, class, ethnic, sexual orientation and gender").
92. For legislation in Australia, see COTTER, supra note 4, at 95-102. The author notes
that laws provide support in childcare and maternity leave as well as prohibitions on sex
discrimination. Additionally, subsequent court decisions were supportive of women's
rights. Id. at 95-99. Moreover, Australia ratified international conventions mandating sex
equality. The Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 prohibits discrimination on the "grounds of
gender, marital status, pregnancy and potential pregnancy, and family responsibilities," but
permits the bonafide occupational qualification (BFOQ) discrimination if "the duties of
the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes ...
that are not possessed by persons of the opposite sex." COTTER, supra note 4, at 97-98
(citing Australia's Sex Discrimination Act of 1984, Sec. 30). Other laws safeguard women
and other groups of workers, "including youth and those from culturally and linguistically
diverse backgrounds" and protect their right to equal remuneration for work of equal
value without discrimination on the grounds of gender. COTTER, supra note 4, at 99.
93. For the role of women in Australia, see id. at 93-95; New Zealand, id. at 102-04;
Africa, id. at 113-15; South Africa, id. at 123; Canada, id. at 139-44; the United States, id. at
153-55; the Commonwealth (United Kingdom), id. at 207-12; and Great Britain, id. at
212-15. Although the author reviews specific legislation in Mexico, Northern Ireland, and
Ireland, the role of women is not discussed. "Double duty" refers to the reality that women
worldwide who join the paid labor force nevertheless continue to shoulder more than their
fair share of household and family responsibilities. See, e.g., id. at 86-87, 141, 155.
94. See COTTER, supra note 4.

20051

Law Is Not Enough

1045

95
pate in the labor force than European/Pakeha women." In addition, "[w]omen in all ethnic groups prioritize their children's
needs over their own ,"96 and when marriages break down, women's
economic standards are lowered. 9 7 Finally, the more a woman contributes to household income, "the more she is likely to have some
say in household financial decisions." 98 It would have been useful
to know whether these, too, are global patterns.

2.

Gender Injustice in Africa and South Africa

In chapter 5, Dr. Cotter succeeds in recognizing the interrelationship and interdependence of the work that African women
accomplish in the work environment and as key providers for their
families, such as producing food, carrying water, collecting fuel
wood, and caring for children and the elderly. 9 9 She highlights the
critical issue of food security and underscores how this exacerbates
women's double burden.1 0 0
Dr. Cotter recognizes that Africa is not monolithic; rather, there
is much diversity "of gender relations, culture, geography, society,
family, economy, and natural resources."' 0 1 These diversities
render it inappropriate to seek a standardized solution for gender
issues. Contrary to the reported negative pattern of globalization
elsewhere, 10 2 globalization in Africa has had a positive impact on
women in trade because of the textiles boom. 0 3 Significantly,
Africa's leaders have undertaken regional initiatives to pursue
women's equality and "promote the role of women in social and
economic development."' 0 4 They have also pledged to "eradicate
poverty and move towards sustainable growth and development."10 5 In this regard, these leaders view ensuring education
and protecting health-including reproductive health-as neces95. Id. at 102.
96. Id. at 104.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 114.
100. Id. at 113.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., id. at 211 (noting that Commonwealth states have recognized that
"[g]lobalization has had negative effects on rising unemployment, poverty and the difficulty of providing social safety nets in weak and vulnerable economies especially affecting
women and children").
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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sary for individual progress, as well as for community and continen6
tal development.10
To be sure, any African legislation concerning equality reflects
the continent's history and emerges as some of the most comprehensive and progressive in the world. 07 Indeed, it recognizes the
"historical tradition and the values of African civilization" 108 and
the need "to eliminate [not only] colonialism, neo-colonialism,
apartheid, [and] zionism"' 0 9 but also "all forms of discrimination."1 10 The Protocol on Rights of Women in Africa"1 prohibits
"all behavior, attitudes and practices which negatively affect
the
fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life,
health and bodily integrity." 112 Furthermore, the Protocol
expressly requires state parties to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women .. .with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful
cultural and traditional practices . . . which are based on the

idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or
on stereotyped roles for men and women."13
Like the progressive and historically-sensitive continental norms,
the Constitution of South Africall 4-the one African nation studied by Dr. Cotter-establishes human dignity and the absence of
racism and sexism as central values for the state." 5 South Africa's
Constitution also expressly guarantees equal protection and recognizes people's multidimensionality by prohibiting discrimination
"on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex,
pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and
106. Id. Specific goals for women include: access to primary education; closing the
gender gap in education; access to healthcare, including reproductive healthcare, family
planning, reduction in infant, child, and maternal mortality and morbidity; and increased
life expectancy. Id. at 115.
107. Id. at 115-16, 123-26, passim.
108. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, adoptedJuly 11, 2003 [hereinafter African Protocol], http://www.achpr.
org/english/_info/womenen.html (last visitedJune 20, 2005), in COTTER, supra note 4, at
115.
109. COTTER, supra note 4, at 116.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
African Charter, supra note 108, at 119-23.
Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 2(2).
South African Constitution, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 124-28.
Id. at 125.
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Gender Injustice in Canada

In her review of Canada, Dr. Cotter links women's advancement
in the labor force to a trend towards women's entrepreneurship
that "has boomed in the last few decades, accounting for more
than one fourth of all employment."'1 " Dr. Cotter suggests that
this move towards self-employment is the result of globalizationcaused "corporate downsizing and restructuring, as well as conin the context of selftracting out and privatization." ' 1 9 Yet, even 120
persists.
gap
wage
employment, the gender
Two observations about Canada are noteworthy: First, the Canadian Human Rights Act12 1 utilizes a comparable worth standard to
achieve pay equity, "where respective work is shown to be equal in
value through a combination of skill, effort, responsibility and
working conditions" 122 by allowing a comparison of the value of the
work. Second, Canada recognizes the effect of status-including
gender, ethnicity, or disability-on employment, and thus realizes
"that employment equity means more than treating persons in the
special measures and the accommodasame way but also requires
123
tion of differences."
4.

Gender Injustice in the United States

In turning to the laws of the United States, Dr. Cotter notes the
historical importance of equality dating to the U.S. Declaration of
116. Id. at 126 (referring to Article 9(3)).
117. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000, Act
No. 4 of 2000, art. 8(a)-(i) (S. Africa), in CoTrER, supra note 4, at 134 (includes the following in the definition of gender discrimination: "(a) gender-based violence; (b) female genital mutilation; (c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; (d)
any practice including traditional, customary or religious practices which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; (e) any policy or conduct that
unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance and other resources; (f) discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy; (g) limiting women's access to social services or benefits, such as health, education and social security; (h) the denial of access to
opportunities . . . [and] (i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a
result of the sexual division of labour").
118. Co-rTER, supra note 4, at 143 (footnote omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 143-44.
121. Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S. 1985, ch. H-6), in CoTrER, supra note 4, at
146-49.
122. Id. at 147.
123. Id. at 150 (referring to Article 2).
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Independence.124 Dr. Cotter, however, fails to mention that at the
time of the Declaration of Independence the idea of equality was
distorted as it coexisted with slavery and the status of women as
chattel. Indeed, the Constitution itself did not originally provide
for equality; 125 this is accomplished through the Fifth 12 6 and Fourteenth12 7 Amendments which guarantee due process of law and
equal protection to citizens. Expansion of the term "equality" continues in the United States; while the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted in reference to racial equality, the Supreme Court has
applied it to sex discrimination as well, albeit in a diluted form.1 28
Dr. Cotter's treatment of U.S. legislation and jurisprudence on
sex equality is disappointingly incomplete and dated. To be sure,
in contrast to the Constitution's silence on sex, the Equal Pay Act
of 1963 did outlaw differential wages for equal work based on
sex. 129 Dr. Cotter, however, does not mention that the Act failed to
incorporate the theory of comparable worth, a concept the courts
have expressly rejected. 130 Moreover, although the Civil Rights Act
of 196413 1 expressly prohibits discrimination in employment on the
basis of sex, unlike South Africa, U.S. courts have refused to recognize discrimination against women based on multidimensionalitysuch as discrimination based on the combination of race and
sex. 13 2 Finally, the Civil Rights Act recognizes the bonafide occupa124.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1976), in COTTER, supra note 4, at 155.

125. U.S. CONST., in COTTER, supra note 4, at 156-58.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 157.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, in COTTER, supra note 4, at 157.
128. See Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing And Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. 36, 38 (1872) (Slaughter-House Cases) (stating that
the purpose of the equal protection clause was only to prohibit race discrimination). But
see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to
invalidate Oklahoma statute establishing differing minimum drinking ages for men and
women). Racial classifications are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. See, e.g., Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1987). Sex-based classifications, however, are
subject only to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig,429 U.S. at 197-99 (1976) (applying
intermediate scrutiny); see also COTTER, supra note 4, at 158.

129. See CoTrER, supra note 4.
130. See County of Washington, Oregon, v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (rejecting
comparable worth); see also Lang v. Kohl's Food Stores, Inc., 217 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting comparable worth claims are not cognizable under the Equal Pay Act).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, June 2, 1964, in COTTER, supra note 4, at
159-61.
132. See Kimberl W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT

FORMED THE MOVEMENT 103 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 482-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (in an action brought by
five black women against former employer alleging that "seniority system and 'last hiredfirst fired' layoff policy mandated by [employer's] collective bargaining agreement perpet-
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tional qualification (BFOQ) defense-detailed below but not
noted by the author-which permits discrimination based on gen133
der roles and stereotypes.
Gender Injustice in the United Kingdom and Ireland

5.

Dr. Cotter considers the public-private employment sector divide
and its attendant deleterious effects on women only briefly in chapter 8. In the context of the Commonwealth of the United Kingdom and Ireland, Dr. Cotter notes that there has been a collapse of
the public-private divide because, "in the application of international human rights law," the state is accountable for violations
against women by private actors.1 34 Unfortunately, Dr. Cotter fails
to engage the significance of this conflation to women. Indeed,
Dr. Cotter observes that traditional perceptions, socioeconomic
impediments, differing levels of education, educational segregation, and discrepancies in levels of political participation continue
to work as obstacles and "affect women's ability to participate fully
and equally in decision-making in the political, public and private
sectors."
V.

135

GENDER INJUSTICE:

A

CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTION

In her conclusion, Dr. Cotter brings together her invaluable
research, reiterating that "gender is a constitutive element of social
relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes
136
and is a primary way of signifying relationships of power."
Hence, Dr. Cotter underscores the need for the type of gender
analysis that reaches beyond historical de jure discrimination to
identify the real defacto discriminatory consequences of ostensibly
neutral norms. Because "society's laws rest on masculinist false
uate[d] the effect of [employer's] past race and sex discrimination, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the claims of race and sex discrimination" under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 were either barred by limitations or failed to state violation of the
Act and reversed the lower court's dismissal of race discrimination claims that were based
on federal civil rights statute on grounds of judicial economy).
133. Civil Rights Act, supra note 131, § 703(e)(1), in COTrER, supra note 4, at 162-67
(providing it is not unlawful to engage in prohibited activity on the basis of "religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise").
134. COTrER, supra note 4, at 207.
135. Id. at 210.
136. Id. at 273 (footnote omitted).
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universals,"'13 7 ubiquitous structural and endemic male biases
imbue law, its institutions, and its processes. 138
Notwithstanding comprehensive international and domestic laws
proscribing sex discrimination and promoting equality, "women
[are] poorer than men across class, race, national, economic and
ethnic lines" in industrial and developing countries alike. 13 9
Although women have progressed in employment, their economic
standing in the paid labor force is far from equal to that enjoyed by
men. 140 Everywhere in the world, women experience gender wage
gaps within similar professions and find themselves in low-paying,
segregated positions that are concentrated in a small number of
occupations and generally lack authority, provide for little, if any
mobility, and offer low pay.1 4 ' Globally, gender differences are
deployed as a pretext to justify the differential treatment of men
and women in the work force. 142
To be sure, women increasingly participate in the labor force
and have sought alternatives such as self-employment, part-time
employment, and home-based work to expand their economic
opportunities.1 43 Yet the informal sector, which provides a larger
source of employment for women than for men, offers less stable
working conditions, provides lower income, and lacks benefits.144
Further, regardless of whether they are employed outside the
home, women bear a double burden because they continue to perform the majority of the unpaid domestic and community work. 145
Globalization has exacerbated the poor working conditions that
women encounter because global employment patterns are "characterized by low wages, little or no labor standards protection, poor
working conditions particularly with regard to women's occupational health and safety, low skill levels, and a lack of job security
and social security, in both the formal and informal sectors."' 46
Female employees still experience discrimination and sexual harassment, notwithstanding the laws prohibiting such conduct.1 4 7 In
addition, the workplace has not changed to accommodate
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 273-76; see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
COTTER, supra note 4, at 273 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 274, passim.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 274, 276.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id. at 274-75; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
COTTER, supra note 4, at 275.
Id. at 276.
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women's needs by offering services such as flexible schedules and
affordable childcare. a48 In her analysis, Dr. Cotter aptly notes that
"rethinking employment policies is necessary in order to integrate
the gender perspective."' 1 49 I completely agree with this proposition, as well as with Dr. Cotter's view that "the legislative and legal
systems are of primary importance in the fight against gender injus50
tices and for gender justice."1
Where Dr. Cotter and I may depart in our forward-looking, common goal for gender equality is in our evaluation of the potential
efficacy of legal systems to assist with the necessary rethinking of
employment policies. Passing, and even enforcing, laws is insufficient to attain equality. As this book demonstrates, all over the
globe laws mandate gender equality and nondiscrimination, yet
inequality persists.
Law, therefore, cannot be the only catalyst for change, especially
when it routinely incorporates male biases. BFOQs illustrate this
point. Throughout her book, Dr. Cotter notes that laws will often
15
have exceptions for equality where there is a so-called BFOQ. 1
Dr. Cotter, however, fails to explain what could possibly constitute
a BFOQ other than tasks that require different biological functions
such as sperm donation, egg donation, wet nursing, or surrogate
motherhood. Outside of these sex-specific "real" limitations, any
BFOQ exception simply permits the continuation and perpetuation of the hetero-patriarchal status quo152-the masculinist false
universe to which the author refers.1 53 The BFOQ defense, therefore, justifies disparities based on stereotypes and traditional gender roles and grants gender discrimination a patina of legality and
legitimacy.
If we rely on law alone, sex discrimination will continue to persist. In order to eradicate myriad gendered inequities discussed in
the book, it is necessary to engage not only the formal processes of
law and legislation, but also the informal processes of family, community, and civil society. In sum, while I agree with Dr. Cotter that
further implementation and development of the law is needed, it is
possible that informal policies-such as those pursued by activist
international nongovernmental organizations which seek to edu148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 277.
151. See supra note 93 (defining "double duty").
152. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy:Tracing the Conflations of Sex, Gender
& Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996).
153. COTrER, supra note 4, at 273.
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cate the public about the need to promote equality and eradicate
violence-may be more efficient in the quest for gender justice
than the formal processes of the courts and legislatures, as such
institutions remain largely imagined, designed, and controlled by
men. 154 Women's position at the margins of employment around
the world is a result of formal state, private, and cultural tropes that
have created and legitimized separate spheres for women's and
men's existences. In addition to the formal development of law, it
is important (1) to develop an informal, parallel track to facilitate
and enhance women's voices globally and locally; (2) to add to
their visibility and provide access to their work and resources; and
(3) to develop a formidable and impressive network of data, information, and support. Such an informal system could initiate the
reconstitution of the rights essential to meet women's needs, effect
their self-determination, and ensure their participation in the
global and local spheres.
Gender Injustice makes a significant contribution to the quest for
gender equality. It offers demographics from around the globe
(although Asia and the Middle East are glaringly absent) and
shows that women worldwide, from the North and South alike,
regardless of race, class, culture, or education: earn less than men;
exist in segregated jobs; and carry the dual burden of working in
the paid labor market and bearing a disproportionate responsibility for household work. This book also provides an outline of the
legal structures and processes in studied states where women have
experienced these same subordinated economic fates. While
presenting data in a more uniform way would have further
enhanced the value of the work for comparative studies, Dr. Cotter
provides an invaluable service in her study of gender inequality.

154. See, e.g., id. at 86 (noting that"equality between men and women has still not been
achieved" with women representing "a mere 10 per cent of all elected legislators worldwide"). For example, in the United States, both houses of Congress, responsible for the
law-making function, are dominated by men. The composition of the 2005 House of Representatives is 369 men and only sixty-six women; the Senate consists of eighty-six men and
only fourteen women. CENTER FOR AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICS, WOMEN IN ELECTIVE
OFICE 2005 FACT SHEET (n.d.), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts.html (last visited June
20, 2005).

